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ABSTRACT 
The paper provides an interpretative framework and structured empirical 
evidence of the processes leading to the emergence of a light and slow 
growth economy in advanced countries. The interpretative framework rests 
upon the grafting of a) the Schumpeterian hypothesis about the 
determinants of the rate of technological change with b) the Kuznets 
approach on the strict complementarity of structural and technological 
change, and c) the new approach about the direction of technological 
change biased towards the most intensive use of locally abundant 
production factors, into d) the dynamic version of the Heckesher-Ohlin 
analysis of international economics that accounts the introduction of new 
technologies as the endogenous search for a new specialization. The 
analysis of the stylized facts and the empirical evidence confirms that the 
twin globalization of product and capital markets brought about by the 
entry of new labor abundant countries in international markets had 
profound effects on advanced countries leading to the introduction of skill 
biased technological change with the consequent decline of the role of the 
manufacturing industry and the emergence of a strong knowledge 
intensive business service sector. The new biased direction of 
technological change accelerated the substitution of both capital and 
unskilled labor with skilled workers with the ultimate effect of reducing 
the stock of working capital and hence the rates of growth of advanced 
economies. The slow growth is a physiological feature of the new 
emerging light economies that rely upon knowledge intensive but capital 
saving technologies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Slow growth has been characterizing advanced countries since the late 
1990s. A variety of interpretations and explications have been elaborated. 
A general consensus about the pathological character of the slow growth 
has emerged. Macroeconomic and fiscal policies aimed at reducing the 
deficit of public administrations and even their debt levels have been 
suggested. Increased liberalizations of both product and factor markets 
have been advocated and often implemented, with little positive effects.  
 
This paper elaborates and tests an interpretative framework that calls 
attention upon the tight relationships between globalization of both 
product and capital markets, the rate and direction of technological 
innovations and the structural change according to which slow growth is 
the physiological result of a major re-organization of the economic 
systems of advanced countries and their evolution into light knowledge 
intensive economies. 
 
In the economics of growth much analysis of the aggregate performances 
of the advanced economies in the last decades has been paid to explaining 
the causes of the slow growth of the advanced economies paying very little 
attention to the role of the radical changes that have been taking place at 
the meso level. In the economics of innovation and technological change 
much attention has been paid to the analysis of the causes and 
consequences of the rate of technological change. Much less attention has 
been given to the direction of technological change and the parallel 
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changes in the structure of the advanced economic systems. Yet the 
direction of technological change has important consequences on the 
structure of the economic system, the international specialization of each 
country and on its economic growth. The paper elaborates an analytical 
approach where the international institutional changes affect both the rate 
and the direction of technological and structural change, the role of a 
country in the international division of labor and ultimately its aggregate 
performances. This framework is applied to provide an interpretative 
framework of the stylized facts about the evolution of the advanced 
economies since the last decades of the XX century and supported by 
structured empirical evidence. 
 
The analytical framework relies upon the grafting of three distinctive and 
yet separated theoretical pillars of the economics of innovation: the 
Schumpeterian hypothesis that innovation is a form of creative reaction 
stirred by un-expected changes in product an factor markets, the Kuznets 
hypothesis that structural and technological change are two intertwined 
facets of the same process of economic change and the new induced 
technological change approach according to which technological change is 
biased towards the use of production factors that are locally more 
abundant. The integration of these three complementary approaches 
enables to substantiate the dynamic version of the Heckesher-Ohlin frame 
so as to provide a coherent interpretation of the interaction between 
changes in the international division of labor, endogenous changes in the 
rate and direction of technological and structural change, changing 
specialization and role in the international division of labor and 
macroeconomic performances. 
 
The basic hypothesis is that the entry of new labor-intensive economies in 
product markets and the creation of an international financial market that 
favored the outflow of capital from advanced countries, and the access to 
low cost capital to industrializing countries, have induced advanced 
economies to implement a new knowledge-intensive technological system 
that uses much less capital substituting both unskilled labor and capital 
with skill-intensive labor and a new specialization in the generation and 
exploitation of technological knowledge.  
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Drawing upon the large literature available the analytical framework 
enables to elaborate an interpretative framework of the main stylized 
events that have characterized the advanced economies since the last 
decades of the XX century. The twin globalization stirred radical 
technological and structural changes and reshaped the international 
division of labor, with the ultimate effect of engendering: i) a persistent 
decline in the price of manufactured goods, ii) reduction in the levels of 
capital intensity in advanced countries and iii) a new specialization in 
knowledge intensive activities characterized by high levels of skilled-labor 
intensity. The fall in the levels of prices of tangible goods and the decline 
in the capital intensity associated with the new emerging knowledge 
economy reduced the value added of the production processes into which 
advanced countries specialize, favoring the emergence of a light and slow 
growth economy.  
 
The consequent slow growth of the light economy is likely to last as long 
as the decline of the manufacturing sector and the disposal of excess 
capital from advanced countries to industrializing ones. When the 
transformation will end approaching a new long term configuration based 
upon a tiny manufacturing industry and a large share of employment in 
knowledge intensive business services, the knowledge economies will be 
able to experience faster rates of growth based upon total factor 
productivity growth. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as it follows. Section 2 provides the 
analytical framework and elaborates the hypothesis. Section 3 presents an 
interpretative framework of the evolution of the advanced economies 
based upon a survey of the existing literature articulated by means of the 
analytical framework. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence. The 
conclusions summarize the result and highlight the implications and 
consequences both for economic analysis and policy. 
 
 
2. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Much theorizing assumes as a starting point of the analysis the increasing 
levels of globalization under way since the late 1990s and more 
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specifically the globalization of product markets brought about by the 
entry in international markets of new large and labor abundant economies. 
 
According to the traditional interpretative framework based upon the static 
version of the well-known Heckesher-Ohlin model, the entry of new labor 
abundant competitors should have pushed advanced countries to increase 
the production of capital-intensive goods and reduce the production of 
labor-intensive ones. Labor abundant newcomers should have on the 
opposite increased their specialization in labor intensive goods and rely 
upon imports from advanced countries in capital intensive ones. 
Correspondingly, newcomers should have increased their specialization in 
labor intensive products and hence experienced a decline in the levels of 
capital intensity. On the opposite advanced countries should have 
experienced a strong increase of the capital intensity of their production 
processes due to the decline of labor intensive activities and their 
substitution with capital intensive ones. 
 
According to the Heckesher-Ohlin model, the entry of new labor-abundant 
countries in international product markets should have brought about a 
drastic fall in the prices of labor-intensive manufactured goods but an 
increase, in relative terms, of the price of capital-intensive goods, with 
positive effects on the terms of trade of advanced countries. After the 
initial shock equilibrium should have been restored in international 
product markets and the flows of imports and export should match in the 
balance of both newcomers and incumbents.  
 
The empirical evidence suggests that these dynamics have not been taking 
place. Quite on the opposite the capital intensity of advanced incumbents 
declined as well as the labor intensity of newcomers. Labor abundant 
countries became net exporters of both capital and labor intensive 
products. The prices of both capital intensive and labor intensive products 
declined and the balance of payments of advanced countries exhibited a 
persistent and even increasing deficit. These contradictions require an 
explanation that can help to grasp the persistent slow growth of advanced 
economies. 
 
Unlike previous experiences in economic history, however, the current 
globalization process concerns both product and financial markets. The 
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globalization of international product markets has changed the 
fundamentals of the division of labor undermining the competitiveness of 
advanced countries and pushing them towards a new specialization. The 
globalization of capital markets has favored the growing outflow of capital 
both via foreign direct investment and the international mobility of 
finance. The twin character of the current globalization pushed the 
emergence of a new systemic gale of radical technologies associated with 
structural changes that enabled advanced countries to change their role in 
the international division of labor specializing in the provision of 
knowledge intensive services to the rest of world.  
 
The twin globalization of both product and capital markets that has 
characterized the last decades of the XX century has stirred a chain 
reaction of structural and technological changes that have affected in depth 
the evolution of the organization and the performances of advanced 
economies. As a matter of fact these intertwined and interacting dynamic 
processes have altered the expected reorganization of the international 
division of labor and the specialization of advanced economies leading to 
the emergence of a light and slow growth economy.  
 
The remaining of this section elaborates an analytical framework based 
upon the grafting of the Schumpeterian analysis of innovation as a form of 
creative response on the analysis of induced structural and technological 
change. The Schumpeterian inducement approach and its integration with 
the Kuznets analysis of structural change and the new induced 
technological change approach, that highlights the role of the bias in favor 
of the intensive use of locally abundant factors, provides the foundations 
to elaborate a dynamic version of the Heckesher-Ohlin model (Rivera-
Batiz, and Romer, 1991).  
 
We contend that this integrated framework provides the tool to grasp the 
key effects of the changes at the meso level on the dynamics at the 
aggregate level and helps explaining the causes and the consequences of 
both structural and technological changes in advanced economies.  This 
framework helps understanding how and why their transformation from 
industrial to knowledge economies is at the origin of their persistent slow 
growth. 
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Following the Schumpeterian hypothesis, firms are induced to innovate by 
the emergence of unexpected out-of-equilibrium conditions in product and 
factor markets. Myopic firms unable to foresee the changing conditions of 
international product markets were caught in out-of-equilibrium conditions 
with falling markets shares and profitability because of the new and 
unexpected competition from new competitors based in labor abundant 
countries. Their successful creative reaction led to the introduction of a 
new gale of convergent information and communication technologies 
characterized by a strong skill bias that favored the specialization of 
advanced countries in the new knowledge-intensive business service 
industry.  
2
 
Following the Schumpeterian hypothesis we contend that firms in 
advanced countries were caught in out-of-equilibrium conditions by the 
drastic and unexpected changes in their product markets brought about by 
the entry of new competitors specializing in labor intensive production 
processes and based in labor abundant countries. Firms in advanced 
countries, relying on rich innovation systems, could react to the fall of 
their performances, the reduction of their rates of growth and profitability 
via the introduction of new technologies.  
 
The gale of new information and communication technologies was the 
result of the drastic effort of advanced countries to cope with the changing 
conditions of the international division of labor. The convergence of a 
variety of diverse and yet complementary technological changes, 
introduced by a large variety of diverse innovators, active in different 
industries and relying on different knowledge bases, all stirred by the 
effort to elaborate a creative response, brought about the emergence of a 
new technological system that helped industrializing the generation of 
scientific knowledge, its direct application to empowering technological 
knowledge and its widespread dissemination for productive uses (; 
Antonelli, 2011a; Stephan, 2011). 
                                                 
2
 According to the late Schumpeter innovation is the creative response that firms caught in out-of-equilibrium 
conditions by unexpected changes in both product and factor markets try and introduce. When and where knowledge 
externalities are missing the reaction of firms is just adaptive and consists in the changes of techniques within a given 
technological space: standard substitution takes place. When and where knowledge externalities actually support their 
reaction and make available external knowledge at costs that are below its reproduction, firms can actually introduce 
new superior products, processes and organizations (Schumpeter, 1947; Antonelli, 2008, 2011a). 
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The accelerate pace of generation of technological knowledge, stirred by 
the changes in the international division of labor, and made possible by the 
collective recombination of diverse and yet complementary unit of new 
knowledge favored the increased rate of technological change. The 
direction of technological change was, instead, biased by the decline of the 
comparative advantage based upon the relative abundance of capital in 
advanced countries.  
 
Building upon the Kuznets hypothesis, technological and structural change 
are strictly intertwined and cannot be separated: when technological 
change is radical the structure of the economic system is profoundly 
affected with radical changes in the organization of the economy and in its 
mix of activities. The gale of new information and communication 
technologies favored the industrialization of the generation and 
exploitation of knowledge as an economic activity leading to the 
emergence of a knowledge-intensive-business service- industry and the 
rapid decline of the manufacturing industry (Kuznets, 1965; North, 2005, 
Dopfer, 2012).  
 
Here the new induced technological change approach fits into the 
framework suggesting that firms caught in out-of-equilibrium conditions 
by radical changes in their product and factor markets did try and react 
directing technological change towards the most intensive use of 
knowledge and skilled labor that were by far the locally more and most 
abundant production factors. 
 
The analysis of the induced direction of technological change as distinct 
from the analysis of the rates of technological change has been revived 
recently after decades of oblivion (Acemoglu, 2002, 2003, 2010). Our 
approach builds upon the traditional inducement approach according to 
which technological change is induced by the relative abundance of inputs 
rather than by their changing prices (Hicks, 1932) or factor shares 
(Samuelson, 1965), but makes an important step forward. The analysis of 
the role of the relative abundance of inputs in assessing the efficiency of 
the production makes it possible to grasp the role of technological 
congruence i.e. the relationship between the relative abundance of an input 
and its output elasticity (Ruttan, 1997 and 2001; Abramovitz and David, 
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1996). In our approach the direction of new technologies is induced by the 
search for congruence efficiency that stems from the directed technologies 
that enable to take advantage of the comparative abundance of production 
factors (Antonelli, 2012).  
 
As soon as we integrate the Heckesher-Ohlin framework with the 
hypothesis that technological change is endogenous as it is stirred by the 
changes in the international product markets, and directed by the changing 
relative endowments of production factors, we can grasp the relationship 
between the globalization of both product and capital markets, the search 
for a new specialization and the introduction of skill biased innovations. In 
the dynamic version of the Heckesher-Ohlin framework incumbents can 
face the changes in the international division of labor determined by the 
entry of new competitors and the consequent decline of their international 
competitivity by means of the introduction of technological changes 
directed towards the more intensive use of locally abundant inputs upon 
which they can structure a new specialization in international markets 
(Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991). 
 
Our hypothesis is that the twin globalization has induced advanced 
countries to elaborate a new specialization based upon the systematic 
generation and exploitation of technological knowledge embodied in 
knowledge intensive business services. This led to the gradual emergence 
of a new skill intensive knowledge economy based on the new information 
and communication technologies that paralleled the shift of economic 
activity away from the manufacturing industry towards knowledge 
intensive business services. This process reduced the demand and the use 
of capital and made the decline of the prices of manufactured products 
persistent with negative effects on the rates of growth that are likely to last 
as long as the transformation of heavy industrialized economies into light 
knowledge ones. 
 
Each of these processes is typically intertwined and feed each other with 
spiraling effects. The search for new investment opportunities in 
industrializing countries increased the globalization of financial markets. 
The globalization of financial markets accelerated the outflow of capital 
from advanced countries and the access of industrializing economies to the 
provision of cheap capital. The provision of cheap capital provided 
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additional momentum on the one hand to the rapid industrialization of the 
newcomers and to the decline of capital as a source of competitive 
advantage for advanced economies on the other. This further reinforced 
the skill bias of the induced technological change in advanced economies 
and hence the substitution of skilled labor to fixed capital with the ultimate 
consequence of increasing the outflow of capital from advanced countries 
and the supply of cheap capital to the fast growing once-labor-intensive 
industrializing economics, favoring their competitiveness in international 
product markets and the further decline of the prices of manufactured 
goods (Modelski, Devezas, Thompson, 2008; Devezas, 2010).  
 
The new endogenous skill biased direction of technological change and the 
structural shift towards the specialization in knowledge intensive services 
are the consequence of economic changes as well the cause of further 
economic changes. The emerging knowledge economy is in fact 
characterized by decreasing levels of the output elasticity of capital, 
decreasing levels of capital intensity and investments with the consequent 
net decline of the actual levels of capital at work in advanced economies. 
 
The slow growth of output associated with the emergence of a light 
economy is a physiological rather than pathological process that is bound 
to last as long as the process of transformation of the economic system and 
the reduction in the levels of fixed capital at work. Building upon this 
analytical framework we can articulate a number of specific hypotheses:  
 
A) The skill intensive direction of technological change is the result of the 
intentional effort of firms in advanced countries in the effort to cope with 
the twin globalization. Hence we expect to test a clear positive relationship 
between the intensity of R&D development expenditures and the growth 
of knowledge intensive business services. 
. 
B) Skill intensive technological change parallels the consolidation of a 
knowledge ‘light’ economy characterized by the decline of the capital 
intensity  
 
C) The increase of knowledge intensive business services accounts for the 
slow growth of advanced economies.  
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3. THE HISTORIC EVIDENCE: AN INTERPRETATIVE 
FRAMEWORK 
 
The analytical framework elaborated so far can be used to review the large 
literature on the changing structure of the economic systems of advanced 
economies so as to provide an interpretative framework that integrates into 
a structured context the analysis of the intertwined processes of 
technological and structural change and international re-specialization that 
have characterized the evolution of the advanced economies since the last 
decades of the XX century (Madison, 2007; Modelski, Devezas, 
Thompson, 2008). 
 
The starting point is the rapid globalization with the liberalization of 
international product markets that favored the entry of new competitors in 
international markets for manufactured goods and the strong decline in 
market prices. The decline of the prices of manufactured goods favored 
consumers in advanced countries but put at risk their industrial base with a 
marked reduction of their rates of growth, destabilizing incumbents with 
the sharp decline of their performances (Krugman, 2009).  
 
The liberalization of international financial markets and the creation of an 
integrated financial system at the global level favored the access of 
newcomers to international credit and made possible an abundant supply 
of cheap capital. A major outflow of capital has been taking place from 
advanced economies towards the new labor abundant industrializing ones 
with major effects in terms of relative and comparative endowments.  
 
The expected Heckesher-Ohlin drift of advanced economies towards the 
increased specialization in capital intensive productions was contrasted by 
the waning of the relative abundance of capital in their factor markets. 
Because of the creation of a globalized financial market, capital was 
becoming equally abundant in advanced incumbents and in industrializing 
newcomers. The absolute cost of capital was becoming more and more 
homogeneous across international markets. The creation of an integrated 
international financial market deprived advanced countries with the 
opportunity to direct technological change towards the traditional bias in 
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favor of capital, the production factor most abundant in rich countries with 
high levels of savings (Zeira, 1998). 
 
The decline in the relative abundance of capital in advanced countries 
activated a search process that made it possible to identify knowledge 
intensive activities based upon skilled labor as the new source of 
competitive advantage and the production factor upon which to implement 
a new specialization, a new role in the international division of labor, a 
new organization of the production process and a new economic structure.  
 
Advanced countries discovered that the direction of technological change 
towards knowledge intensive activities based upon skilled labor was the 
new possible source of competitive advantage. Advanced economies have 
a strong comparative advantage in the generation of technological 
knowledge and skilled labor is much more abundant and relatively cheaper 
in advanced countries than in industrializing ones. Moreover advanced 
countries were able to attract skilled labor from industrializing countries 
favoring a major brain-drain. The relative abundance of skills was not 
endangered by any risk of mobility towards industrializing countries 
(Agosis, Alvarez, Bravo-Ortega, 2012).  
 
Skilled labor and the institutional fabric of knowledge generation activities 
at the end of the XX century were much abundant in advanced economies 
and happened to be in relative terms the production factor for which the 
comparative abundance was far larger than any other traditional input such 
as unskilled labor and capital. In the search for congruence technological 
change stirred by the globalization of product markets was directed 
towards the most intensive use of the most abundant production factors in 
domestic factor markets (Abramovitz and David, 1996; Antonelli, 2012). 
 
The introduction of directed technological change biased towards high 
levels of skill intensity had strong consequences on the international 
division of labor. Advanced countries specialized more and more in the 
production of skill-intensive products with a strong content in terms of 
technological knowledge. Advanced countries reduced their markets 
shares in tangible products concentrating in the export of capital goods and 
high quality fashion products and specialized in the export of non-tangible 
services. New industrializing countries became net exporters of 
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manufactured, tangible products especially in the markets for final goods 
(Nickell, Redding, Swaffield, 2008).  
 
With respect to the domestic factor markets of advanced countries, the new 
skill bias of technological change led to the substitution of both capital and 
unskilled labor, with the reduction of the derived demand for both. In the 
capital markets the new direction of technological change engendered the 
downward shift of the derived demand for capital with a reduction in the 
levels of working capital. Investments in fixed capital declined. This 
reinforced and strengthened the international mobility of capital both in 
the form of international direct investments with the growth of 
multinational companies and in the form of an augmented global financial 
market (Figini and Görg, 2011).  
 
The emergence of the global corporation characterized by high levels of 
internal division of labor across countries favored the specialization of 
headquarters based in advanced countries in skill-intensive activities and 
the displacement of manufacturing activities towards labor intensive 
countries with major flows of foreign direct investments from advanced to 
industrializing countries (Caves, 2007; Dunning, 2008; Helpman, 2006). 
 
The financial companies of advanced countries found new opportunities 
for growth specializing in the provision of finance to the new 
industrializing countries. They could make use of the large supply of 
excess capital that was becoming available in the internal financial markets 
activating new channels of distribution of credit to the newcomers in the 
international economy.  
 
In the labor markets, average wages, consistently with the factor 
equalization theorem, declined (Samuelson, 1948). This trend however 
was contrasted by the new direction of technological change biased 
towards higher levels of skill intensity. As a result the variance of wage 
levels increased with increasing levels of inequality engendered by the 
creation of a highly segmented labor market with two emerging 
submarkets separated by strong differences in terms of professional 
requirements and little opportunities for retraining and hence low levels of 
mobility (Wood, 1994).  
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The changes in the demand for labor engendered an increasing mismatch 
with the current supply of labor. The supply of skilled labor was unable to 
match the increasing derived demand with increasing tensions in terms of 
wages. On the other labor market the supply of unskilled labor was much 
larger than the demand with lowering wages and increasing levels of 
structural unemployment (Lee and Vivarelli, 2004; Autor and Dorn, 2011). 
 
Within advanced economies the new biased technological change 
paralleled a major structural change with the growth of a new service 
economy, the fast rise of the knowledge intensive business services, the 
decline of the manufacturing industry and its radical reorganization based 
upon skill-intensive production processes with a high content of 
knowledge intensity embodied in skilled labor (Bonatti, Felice, 2008; 
Maroto-Sánchez, Cuadrado-Roura, 2009). 
 
In advanced countries a new ‘light’ knowledge and skill intensive 
economy is substituting the heavy fixed capital intensive economy that 
characterized the first part of the XX century.  Skill biased technological 
change has been the result of a strong endogenous process of inducement 
activated by the changing relative prices in both product and factor 
markets engendered by the fast globalization based upon the entry of new 
labor abundant economies that could take advantage of the large and 
increasing supply of cheap capital (Kang and Lee, 2011). 
 
 It is clear that the direction of technological change towards the skill bias 
was induced by the globalization of product and financial markets and yet 
reinforced it. The substitution of skilled labor to fixed capital decreased 
the derived demand for capital and increased the availability of capital in 
the internal financial markets of advanced countries leading to the 
emergence of idle financial resources. The reduction of the levels of 
working capital pushed the financial system to try and make some use of 
it: excess investment in the real estate was a typical consequence (Stiglitz, 
2010; Gatti et al., 2012). 
 
The new foundations of production processes in advanced economies with 
lowering levels of fixed capital and increasing levels of human capital has 
direct effects not only on the specialization of the advanced economies, 
but also on their aggregate performances in terms of rates of growth. It is 
 15 
clear in fact that the reduction in the output elasticity of capital and the 
relative decline in the intensity of fixed capital of production processes 
exert a negative effect on the amount of value added that the system is able 
to generate.  
 
The general outcome of the structured review of the literature available 
confirms that globalization induced a new flow of technological changes, 
biased towards the creation of a light economy with high levels of skill 
intensity and more specifically a new structure of the economy of 
advanced countries, characterized by lowering levels of employment in the 
traditional manufacturing industries and increasing levels of employment 
in the knowledge intensive business services. Advanced economies built a 
new specialization in the world economy characterized by high knowledge 
intensity with high levels of research and development activities. These 
processes favored the reduction of the amount of capital at work in 
advanced economies and its transfer to industrializing ones. The reduction 
of the amount of capital at work, associated with the skill bias of 
technological change and the consequent decline of its output elasticity, 
explains the structural and short-term contraction in the rate of growth of 
output of advanced countries. The conjunctural effects are determined by 
the contraction of the aggregate demand stemming from the fall of 
investments and hence of the derived demand for capital goods. The 
structural effects are determined by the sheer contraction of the amount of 
fixed capital at work in the economy. The empirical evidence provided by 
Chapter 4 will focus the structural effects.  
 
 
4.  THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
4.1 THE DATA 
We check the empirical validity of our analytical framework by using 
three different sources of data. The first database draws on data from 
OECD STAN and STAN BERD, providing economic data at the sectoral 
level on value added, capital stock, employment, wages and R&D 
expenditures disaggregated at the sectoral level, covering most of the 
OECD countries. These data allowed us to build a  fairly balanced panel 
with 24 countries, for the time-span 1990-2007 (see the Appendix for the 
list of countries included and for descriptive statistics).  
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We integrated the OECD data with a second source of data: is the EU-
KLEMS database (O’Mahony, and Timmer, 2009), This database provides 
extremely detailed and reliable information at the sectoral levelfor the 
main economic variables of European economies, as well as US, Australia, 
Japan and Canada.  
Finally, in order to include in our analysis also developing and newly 
industrialized countries, as a third source of data we used the Total 
Economy Database (TED)
3
, which covers more than 120 countries and, 
among other important economic variables, provides data about the growth 
of capital services, thus allowing us to check for the intensity of the 
process of capital accumulation.  
 
4.2. TECHNOLOGICAL AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN 
ADVANCED ECONOMIES 
 
As already stated our hypothesis is that the twin globalization of both 
product and financial markets pushed advanced countries to specialize in 
skill-intensive economic activities, taking advantage of the relative 
abundance of educated workforce among their internal labour markets. 
Such a dynamic led to the transformation of manufacturing-based 
economies into knowledge ‘light’ economies, with a predominance of 
skill-intensive service industries with a high content of knowledge 
intensity. 
 
In order to provide empirical evidence to our statements we decided to 
analyze the patterns of development of manufacturing sectors, on the one 
hand, and of a set of economic activities that can well represent the 
Knowledge Intensive Business Sectors (henceforth KIBS) on the other 
hand. Indeed the wide literature related with KIBS (Boden and Miles, 
1999; Di Maria, Grandinetto, Di Bernardo, 2012), has identified these 
service sectors as those in which the knowledge intensity is higher:  we 
can hence consider them as a good proxy of the new skill-biased types of 
economic activities. Muller and Doloreux (2009) provide a useful 
description of what KIBS and highlight the main features that distinguish 
KIBS from other types of private services. KIBS rely heavily on 
professional knowledge, are themselves primary sources of information 
                                                 
3
 The database is managed by the Conference Board and created through the harmonization of the Total Economy 
Growth Accounting Database of the Groningen Growth and Development Centre and the world economy productivity 
data set created by Dale Jorgenson and Khuong Vu. 
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and knowledge and use knowledge to produce intermediate services for 
their clients’ production processes. 
 
Yet we need to choose the sectors that in the international sectoral 
classifications can be identified as KIBS. We follow Freel (2006), who 
identifies KIBS sectors with the two-digit sectors 72, 73 and 74 of the 
ISIC Rev. 3 classification. In order to maximize the number of 
observations we include also sector 71, which in many countries’ national 
accounts is aggregated together with the other 3 two-digit sectors. We 
hence classified as KIBS the following 2-digit ISIC Rev. 3 sectors: 
 
- The renting of machinery and equipment (71) 
- Computer and related activities (72) 
- Research and development (73) 
- Other business activities (74) 
 
Our aim is to show the gradual decrease of centrality of manufacturing 
sectors among advanced countries and the corresponding growth of KIBS. 
We chose to do that through the analysis of the changing shares of 
employment between KIBS and manufacturing sectors. In order to provide 
the highest level of detail and use the number of hours worked within both 
aggregates we rely upon the EU-KLEMS database, which provides the 
most accurate data. KLEMS data range from 1970 to 2010. We then 
plotted the number of hours worked in the manufacturing sectors and in 
the KIBS sectors in a selected number of developed countries.  
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
 
Figure (1) shows the generalized decline of the hours worked within the 
manufacturing sectors: even industry-based countries such as Germany, 
Japan and Italy display a constant decrease of the hours worked in 
industrial sectors, especially after 1990. The other countries show an even 
steeper decline of the number of hours worked in manufacturing, with 
United Kingdom displaying the sharpest decrease. After 1980 we observe 
a large increase of the number of hours worked in KIBS, with Australia, 
the Netherlands and United States displaying the highest rates of increase 
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in the last 30 years. Furthermore in specific countries such as the United 
States, Australia, France, the Netherlands and United Kingdom, starting 
from 2000 onward, the hours worked in the KIBS sectors overtook the 
number of hours worked in the manufacturing sectors. In countries such as 
Germany, Italy, Spain and Japan the gap between KIBS and 
manufacturing did not disappear also after 2000, although it largely 
decreased with respect to the beginning of the 80’s. 
 
A major structural change occurred in the last 30 years within advanced 
economies and the growth of KIBS is its most evident facet. This 
structural change was the outcome of a process of technological change 
biased towards the use of the most abundant resource, present in advanced 
capitalistic countries, i.e. skilled-labour. If this is the case we expect to 
find a positive correlation at the aggregate level between the efforts 
directed towards the improvement of the technologies at stake and the 
structural change represented by the growth of KIBS. 
 
In this respect the investments in Research and Development performed by 
private companies represent a very good proxy of the technological effort 
of a country. If the effort of countries to specialize towards technologies 
with a high knowledge-content also led to the growth of KIBS, we should 
observe the following relationship between KIBS and R&D intensity: 
 
KIBS = a + b RDint                                                                               (1) 
 
In which we expect the coefficient of R&D to be strictly positive. Here we 
take advantage of our OECD-based panel database for the years 1990-
2010and provide a preliminary test on the existence of this relationship. 
We proxy the two variables of interest with the following measures:  
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i and t are respectively country and time indexes. KibsL is the number of 
workers employed in the KIBS sector (as previously defined in the ISIC 
Rev. 3 classification), L is the total employment within a country and 
PubL is the total number of workers employed in the public sector, that is 
all the two-digit sectors of the ISIC Rev. 3 classification grouped together 
as “Community, Social and Personal Services” (75-99)
4
. We subtract the 
number of employees in the public sector from the total number of person 
employed in order to make sure that our data are not influenced by 
dynamics that are not strictly related to private economic activities. By 
excluding the public sector we can be sure that what we are observing is 
not influenced by the implementation of public policies that might alter the 
aggregate results. 
 
RDint instead measures the intensity of R&D expenditures per worker 
(OECD STAN-BERD): RD is the yearly expenditures in R&D (in constant 
prices and 2005 Purchasing Power Parities) performed by private firms. 
The intensity of R&D per worker is computed dividing the expenditures in 
R&D by the total number of workers in the economy (as we did before for 
KIBS share of employment, we subtract the number of employees 
belonging to the public sector) and taking its log. 
 
 
 
INSERT FIGURES 2 AND 3 HERE 
 
 
We are not really interested in determining the degree to which R&D 
expenditures Granger-caused the growth of employment in KIBS sectors, 
since this is not the main object of this paper. Hence we limit ourselves to 
a rather “visual” analysis of the relationship between the two variables: for 
the sake of our analysis it is sufficient to speak of a positive correlation 
between KIBS and R&D intensity. In Figures (2) and (3) we plotted the 
two variables for 4 different years between 1990 and 2007, we also report 
the heteroskedasticity-robust OLS estimates (and their standard errors) of 
                                                 
4
 The set of economic activities included within the “Community, Social and Personal Services” group are the 
following: Public Admin. and Defence - Compulsory Social Security (75); Education (80); Health and Social Work 
(85); Other Community, Social and Personal Services (90-93); Sewage and Refuse Disposal, Sanitation and Similar 
Activities (90); Activities Of Membership Organizations N.E.C. (91); Recreational, Cultural and Sporting Activities 
(92); Other Service Activities (93); Private Households with Employed Persons (95); Extra-Territorial Organizations 
and Bodies (99) 
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the estimation of equation (1) in the different years. As it is evident in the 
figures the number of observation increases as time goes by, since data on 
R&D expenditures and KIBS employment in some countries are available 
only for more recent years. Starting from 1996 the positive relationship 
between the two variables becomes significant and strictly positive. The 
figures also allow to identifying which countries have a higher share of 
KIBS employment and what is their R&D intensity.  
 
As expected more advanced countries such as United States and the main 
European countries occupy the top-right area of the plot, while on the 
opposite Southern and Eastern European countries such as Greece, 
Portugal, Hungary and Czech Republic display low values both in terms of 
KIBS employment and R&D intensity. Although the relationship is 
statistically significant for the years from 1996 onward, it is interesting to 
note that also among advanced countries there are different patterns of 
development: the actual fitted line is an average between more industrial-
oriented countries like Japan and Germany, in which R&D intensity is 
relatively higher than KIBS employment, and services-based countries like 
the Netherlands, UK and US in which the opposite occurs. 
Notwithstanding these differences it seems quite evident that these two 
variables show a clear positive correlation, which highlights the fact that in 
the last 20 years technological change and the growth of KIBS have grown 
together. 
 
4.3. STRUCTURAL CHANGE IS CAPITAL SAVING 
 
The next step consists in exploring the direction of technological change. 
According to our hypothesis technological change introduced in advanced 
economies since the emergence of the twin globalization is strongly biased 
in favor of skill intensive activities and away from capital intensive ones. 
Building upon the strict complementarity between the intensity of 
technological change and the structural change consisting in the 
specialization in knowledge-intensive business service industries tested in 
the previous step, we explore now the relationship between the emerging 
specialization in knowledge intensive business services and the capital 
intensity.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
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Since we have already shown that KIBS sectors are those that benefited 
the most from the process of structural change and displayed the highest 
rates of growth of employment, a first way to check whether their growth 
could possibly affect the flows of investment in fixed capital within a 
country is to compare the levels of capital intensity of the expanding KIBS 
and those of the declining manufacturing sectors. In Figure (4) we plot the 
capital intensity of the whole of the manufacturing sectors and of the KIBS 
sectors for the years 1990-2007. In order to compute the capital intensity 
(K) of manufacturing and KIBS sectors we use the following formula: 
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                 (4) 
 
Where i, j and t are respectively country, sector and time indexes. Again 
we take advantage of the EU-KLEMS database since it allows to 
discriminate among different types of capital: CAP denotes the overall 
fixed capital stock of each sector (in constant prices and 2005 Purchasing 
Power Parities), while RESID indicates the part of the capital stock that is 
made of residential structures.
5
 PPP is the usual Purchasing Power Parity 
deflator derived from the GDP deflator (OECD Economic Outlook), while 
H denotes the number of hours worked in each national sector analyzed. 
 
As Figure (4) shows, in the great majority of the cases we observe a 
sustained gap between the two levels of capital intensity. If we exclude 
Italy
6
 and Germany the level of capitalistic intensity in the manufacturing 
sectors is always higher than in the KIBS sectors. In Table (1) the average 
levels of capital intensity in two different sub-periods (1990-2000 and 
2000-2007) for the selected countries are reported. The Table highlights 
two main facts: first of all on average the capital intensity within KIBS is 
broadly 60% of that of the manufacturing sectors, with Germany, Italy and 
Japan representing the upper bound and Spain displaying the lowest ratio 
among all countries. Second of all we do not observe any reduction of the 
                                                 
5
 We decided to subtract the residential structures since the different accounting methods implemented by each country 
could possibly create some cross-country variability in the shares of these component on the total capital stock, which 
might eventually influence the overall levels of capital intensity, and hence the comparability among countries. 
6
 The steep downward sloping curve of Italian capitalistic intensity within KIBS sectors, however, raise some doubts 
about the reliability of the KLEMS data for this country. 
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gap between the two levels of capital intensity in the second sub-period: in 
the years between 2000 and 2007 the ratio is stable around 60%, the only 
countries that experienced a substantial growth of this ratio are the United 
Kingdom and the United States. 
 
Once we have shown that KIBS sectors have become increasingly central 
within advanced economies and that their capitalistic intensity is 
substantially lower with respect to manufacturing sectors, we can check 
whether these structural changes also modified the overall role of capital 
within advanced economies. If that was the case we might be able to link 
the slow growth of investments within advanced economies with the 
upsurge of knowledge-based services sectors. 
 
In order to test this relationship we measure to what extent the growth of 
KIBS influences the growth of capital intensity. Through our  OECD-
based panel database covering 15 countries and the years 1990-2007 we 
test the following equation: 
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Where the index n denotes the number of years used in the computation of 
the differences ( n  indicates differences between t and t – n). The indexes 
i and t denote country and time,  j instead indicates the number of lags 
used (as a matter of example 11  itx indicates that we are taking the 
differences between the levels of x in t-1 and t-2). Finally i  and t  
indicate respectively country and time fixed effects, while it , denotes a 
country-specific, idiosyncratic shock. 
 
Our measure of capital intensity (Kit) is computed as follows: 
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CAPit is the overall net capital stock at the country level, PubCAPit instead 
is the country-level net capital stock that refers to the public sector.
 7
 Lit 
instead is the overall level of employment and PubLit is the number of 
workers employed in the public sector. Also in this case we subtract the 
public sector from the total capital stocks and from total GDP in order to 
make sure that our data are not influenced by dynamics that are not strictly 
related to private economic activities. 
8
 
 
The independent variables are the growth rate of the number of persons 
employed in KIBS and the growth rate of R&D expenditures. Furthermore 
we add two other control variables such as 
jitnw  , the growth rate of 
wages within a country, and 
jitOPEN  , that is the share of international 
trade on total GDP.
9
. 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
In Table (2) are presented the results from the estimation of equation (5), 
including country and time fixed effects.
10
  
 
The first specification, in columns (1) to (3), introduces the 
contemporaneous one-year rates of growth of the independent variables. 
The results show that both the growth of employment in KIBS and the 
growth of R&D expenditures from one year to the other have a negative 
effect on the growth of the capital intensity within a country. Although we 
are using fixed effects, which should ensure that the results are not driven 
by unobserved heterogeneity included in the error term and correlated with 
the regressors, we chose to include additional variables in order to control 
as much as possible for the heterogeneity among countries. In column (3) 
we then include the growth rate of the average wage and the international 
                                                 
7
 As in the formulas (2) and (3) we classify all the two-digit sectors of the ISIC Rev. 3 classification grouped together 
within the macro category “Community, Social and Personal Services” (75-99) as public sectors. 
8
 By excluding the public sector, we can be sure that what we are observing is not influenced by the implementation of 
public policies, in particular we are able to avoid problems related to the accounting methods of public investments, 
which very often differ across countries. 
9
 The growth of real wages is proxied by the increase of the total sum of labour compensation in the private sector, as 
provided by OECD-STAN. The openness to trade variable (the share of imports and exports on GDP) is provided by the 
OECD TIP database. 
10
 Random effects estimators have been discarded on the basis of the results of the Hausman test. 
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trade-over GDP ratio, as a proxy for the openness of a country: both 
variables show negative and significant coefficients, but do not affect the 
sign and significance of the KIBS and R&D variables.   
 
In order to provide further robustness to our results, in columns 4 to 6 we 
lag the independent variable by one year, in order to check whether our 
previous results could be affected by problems of simultaneity: however 
the results remain unchanged, only the coefficient of the growth of wages 
loses its significance.  
 
Finally we decided to check whether these results are driven by short run 
dynamics and whether they hold also when we introduce long differences. 
In columns (7) we present the results of the estimation of equation (5) with 
n=4; we hence confined our analysis to the time-spans 1991-1995, 1995-
1999, 1999-2003, 2003-2007, reducing by far the overall number of 
observations. However the results are still in line with those obtained with 
first differences. In column (8) we also lagged by one year, as in the first-
differences case, the independent variables, without any significant change 
in the results. Our results confirm that the increasing centrality of KIBS 
determined a slowdown of the overall capitalistic intensity within 
advanced economies. 
 
4.4 THE CONTRASTING DYNAMICS OF CAPITAL DEEPENING 
IN ADVANCED AND INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES 
 
So far we have shown that the structural changed occurred in advanced 
capitalistic countries, and which is well represented by the growth of 
KIBS, determined a decrease of the intensity of the investments in fixed 
capital in these countries. Yet our hypothesis is that the international 
financial system has allowed for a rapid and increasing shift of capital 
resources from advanced economies, where the investment intensity was 
slowering, towards industrializing ones. This mechanism has inverted the 
well-known H-O mechanism, thus allowing developing countries to 
produce and specialize in capital-intensive products.  
 
If that was the case then, when looking at the aggregate statistics of capital 
formation we should observe a sustained increase of investments among 
developing countries.  
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The TED Database allows to checking for this general pattern, since it 
provides detailed data on the growth rate of capital services also for non-
OECD countries. Specifically we chose to focus on a group of 
industrializing and fast-growing countries, mainly located in Asia, and we 
compared them with Western European countries, Japan, the United 
States, Canada and Australia. We also chose to provide a thinner analysis 
of investment activities and take advantage of the distinction offered by 
the TED Database between investments in ICT assets and non-ICT assets, 
focusing only on the former ones, since these should represent more 
directly the investments in machinery and facilities usually associated with 
manufacturing activity and the production of goods. 
 
In Table (3) and (4) we present the data on the growth rates of non-ICT 
capital services in the period 1990-2007 among advanced economies, as 
opposed to newly industrialized countries (mainly East Asian countries, 
including China, India and Brazil as the non-Asian country). The results 
strongly confirm our first statement: the average growth rates are 
substantially lower in advanced countries with respect to industrializing 
ones.  
 
In Table (3) we notice that the average growth rate ranges between a 
minimum of 0.70 (Finland) to a maximum of 3.99 (Australia) percentage 
points within the subset of advanced economies. Among the group of 
industrializing countries instead the average growth rates for the same 
period are much higher, ranging between 4.47 (Singapore) and 9.12 
(China), with the only exception of Brazil (1.97).  
 
INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4 HERE 
 
By plotting the average growth rate of the advanced countries and of the 
industrializing ones in the period 1990-2007, the graph in Figure (5) shows 
even more clearly the difference in the growth of non-ICT capital services 
between advanced and industrializing countries.  
 
From 1990 until 1997 the two lines show opposite dynamics: while 
advanced countries experience a general decrease of investments from 
1992 onward, the average growth rate of non-ICT capital services among 
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industrializing countries constantly increases. Not surprisingly in 1997-
1998 we observe an abrupt fall of the average rate of growth of 
industrializing countries, due to the 1997 Asian financial crisis
11
.However 
the average growth rate of industrializing countries remains higher than in 
European and North American countries also during these years. 
Furthermore during the first half of the 2000’s the growth rate gradually 
recovers, although it does not reach the pre-crisis levels.  
 
This kind of evidence provides a further confirmation of our hypothesis 
about the global division of labour: industrializing countries have kept 
accumulating fixed capital from 1990 onward, while advanced countries 
have experienced a much lower growth of the capital intensity of their 
productive structure. Advanced countries did not specialize in the 
production of capital intensive goods, as the H-O model would predict, but 
rather specialized in knowledge-intensive economic activities, well 
represented by KIBS. 
 
4.5. THE EVIDENCE ON THE SLOW GROWTH HYPOTHESIS 
 
We can now test the final equation where we assess the effects of the 
specialization in skill-intensive capital saving KIBS stemming from the 
new direction of technological change on the rates of growth of value 
added. As already spelled out in the previous sections, since growth is still 
mainly driven by the manufacturing sectors and by the accumulation of 
capital, we expect to find a negative or non-significant relationship 
between the size of KIBS and the growth of value added.  
 
In order to measure the impact of KIBS on the growth rate of value added 
we take advantage of our OECD-based database covering the years from 
1990 to 2007 and including 15 countries (see Table A1 in Appendix) and 
we assume a typical Cobb-Douglas production function that represents the 
technology by means of which countries transform inputs into output. Lit 
measures the number of employees within a country, Kit denotes the 
capital stock and Yit the total value added, with constant returns to scale.  
 
                                                 
11
 As is well known the Asian financial crisis affected in particular Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand, 
while, as the data show, it did not lowered the growth of capital services of countries such as China or India 
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To complement the Cobb–Douglas aggregate production function 
approach with the necessary consideration of both technological and 
structural change we introduce two specific variables: Ait and Sit. These 
two variables represent the share of value added that is not accounted for 
by the levels of capital and labor, the well-known residual (Solow, 1957). 
Our hypothesis is that such residual is due to two different factors. The 
first –Ait – depends on the overall efficiency of the production process, 
while the second –Sit –is linked to the overall structure of the economy, to 
the specific sectoral specialization of a country. While Ait is expected to 
capture the Schumpeterian effect of innovation on the efficiency of an 
economy, Sit introduces also the Kuznets’s concept of structural change.  
 
The specification of the country-level production function is the following: 
 
ititititit SALKY
           (7) 
 
We assume constant returns to scale at the country level, that is 1  . 
Dividing both sides by Lit we have: 
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Where Yit/Lit is labor productivity and Kit/Lit is capital intensity. Then – 
writing 
ititit
LYy   and 
ititit
LKk   – we take logs and transform 
equation (8) in growth rates, obtaining our structural model: 
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In order to estimate our equation of interest we need to identify a reduced 
form model, that is we need to proxy the growth rates of both Ait and Sit. 
Following Griliches (1979) and the literature on technological change and 
productivity growth (Griffith, Redding, Van Reenen 2004; Mairesse, 
Mohnen, 1990) our hypothesis is that the growth of the efficiency term Ait 
depends on each country’s specific technological effort, proxied as usual 
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by the intensity of R&D expenditures (R&D over employment).
12
 The rate 
of change of the structural parameter Sit instead is proxied by the intensity 
of the structural change occurred within a country. A good indicator of the 
extent of the process of structural change is the share of employment in 
KIBS sectors. Hence the growth rate of Ait and Sit can well be defined by 
the following equations: 
 
itit RDgA intln
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Where RDint is the ratio of the expenditures in R&D over the total 
employment in the private sector (see equation (3)), while KIBS is the ratio 
of employment in KIBS over total private employment (see equation (2)). 
Substituting equations (10) and (11) into equation (9) yields the following 
specification: 
 
ittititititit KIBSRDky  
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Furthermore, given the deep intertwining and the high positive correlation 
between these two variables, as shown in section (4.2), we also include an 
interaction term between R&D intensity and the share of employment in 
KIBS. The interaction variable enables to capture the marginal effects of 
R&D expenditures and KIBS intensity. We assume, in fact, that the 
marginal effect of each of the two variables depends upon the level of the 
other variable. In other words the effect of R&D will be influenced by the 
KIBS intensity and viceversa. Our final equation is then: 
 
ittititititititit RDKIBSKIBSRDky  
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Finally we obtain the discrete approximation of the growth rates through 
the following expression: 
 
                                                 
12
 R&D expenditures are expressed in real prices and in Purchasing Power Parities US dollars, as provided by the 
OECD STAN-BERD database, in order to obtain comparable measures across countries. 
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In equation (14) i , t  and it  denote respectively country, time and 
idiosyncratic shocks. In the estimation of equation (14) we introduce both 
country and time dummies in order to rule out i  and t  from the error 
term. We are hence excluding the possibility that our independent 
variables are correlated with country-specific unobservables and with 
common time shocks.  
 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
 
The results in column (1) of Table (5) show that the elasticity of capital 
(0.328) is perfectly in line with the size usually found in the literature 
(Griliches and Mairesse, 1998; Olley and Pakes, 1996); however what we 
are specifically interested in are the coefficients of R&D intensity and 
KIBS share of employment, that is the two variables that proxy the 
efficiency and structural parameter. Yet in column (1) the coefficients of 
the two variables are both small and display large standard errors, showing 
that apparently there is not a straightforward relationship between these 
variables and labour productivity growth. However when in column (2) we 
include the interaction term, the parameters of RDint and KIBS become 
negative and significant, while the interaction term shows a positive and 
significant coefficient.  
 
These results are also robust to the inclusion, in column (3), of the 
openness-to-trade variable.  In order to provide a proper interpretation of 
the results obtained with the interaction term, in Figures (6) and (7) we 
plotted the overall marginal effect of R&Dint and KIBS over labor 
productivity. Following simple algebra, and taking into account notation in 
equation (14), the marginal effect of each of these two variables will be 
equal to: 
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Figure (6) shows that the effect of R&D intensity over the growth of labor 
productivity growth becomes positive as the share of KIBS increases: in 
particular when a country exceeds the threshold of 10-11% of KIBS 
employment the effect of R&D intensity becomes positive. Looking at 
Figures 2 and 3 we notice that this threshold was crossed only by the most 
advanced countries in 1991, but already in 2001 the majority of countries 
was beyond this value. So we can state that for most of the advanced 
economies R&D intensity has a positive effect on the growth of labour 
productivity. Also the overall marginal effect of the KIBS share of 
employment on labor productivity growth is positively related with the 
intensity of R&D (Figure 7), but only quite high levels (higher than the 
value of 7 in log intensities) of R&D intensity allow KIBS to show a non-
negative effect. When looking at Figures 2 and 3 we notice that only few 
countries attained these levels of R&D intensity, even in recent years. 
 
 
INSERT FIGURES 6 AND 7 HERE 
 
 
 
In columns from (4) to (6) in Table (5), we check whether our results are 
robust to different specifications. Specifically it could be the case that the 
effect of capital deepening and technological and structural change on 
labour productivity growth occurs after a certain lag. Hence in columns 
(4)-(6) we lag by one year all the independent variables: the results 
however are very robust and they confirm the previous findings.  
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Endogeneity issues 
 
Even if the lagged specifications in columns (4)-(6) should partly reassure 
us about the possible problems of endogeneity of equation (14), it seems 
necessary to provide a more complete examination of these issues.  
 
A great limitation of OLS estimators is that, even after controlling for 
country and time effects, we still need the assumption of strict exogeneity 
of all the independent variables with respect to the idiosyncratic shock it
(Griliches and Mairesse, 1998; Nickell, 1981), i.e,. we are assuming that: 
 
0,0)(  jxE jitit                 (17)  
 
and 
 
1,0)(  sxE sitit                        (18) 
 
In the case of the share of employment in KIBS sectors we consider these 
assumptions as tenable, since the process of structural change takes places 
at a very slow pace and is not influenced by temporary shocks in the 
growth rate of labor productivity. On the contrary it seems reasonable to 
assume that some of our regressors are uncorrelated with the error terms 
only when, in equation (17), j>0, that is they are uncorrelated only with 
future un-predicted shocks. Conversely a present or past shock in the 
productivity growth rate is likely to influence the present levels of these 
regressors. We suspect this to be especially important in the case of 
capital-intensity growth and R&D investments. Indeed if a country 
experiences a negative shock on labor productivity growth in time t, it is 
likely that such a shock will affect the investments in fixed capital and in 
R&D in the same period. Also a shock occurred in the previous year will 
probably influence the investments decisions in the following year, since it 
may affect the expectations about the future economic scenarios. We 
hence consider the growth of capital intensity and R&D intensity as 
endogenous variables (Blundell and Bond, 1998), which means that:  
 
0,0)(  jxE jitit                 (17) 
 
and 
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0,0)(  sxE sitit                      (18) 
 
In order to solve this problem, following Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and 
the literature on GMM-based estimation of endogenous variable in a panel 
setting, we chose to instrument the independent variables with their own 
lags, exploiting the fact that: 
 
0)|( 1 tiit xE                         (19) 
where ),...,( 11
1

  iti
t
i xxx  
In other words we take advantage of the fact that past realizations of the 
independent variables are uncorrelated with the contemporaneous 
idiosyncratic shock, but at the same time they are likely to be correlated 
with the contemporaneous level of the endogenous variable. These 
features make them a proper instrument for our estimation: we hence 
exploit the moments depicted in equation (19) for our estimation.  
 
In order to check whether our assumptions about endogeneity are correct 
we rely on the usual Durbin-Wu-Hausman specification test (Wu, 1973; 
Hausman, 1978) which allows to check which of the variables of our 
estimation are actually endogenous. We run three different regressions and 
in each of them we instrument one of our variables of interest with its own 
lags
13
. After each estimation (shown in Table 6) we check the validity of 
our choice of instruments through a Sargan test of overidentifying 
restrictions, and then we check for the exogeneity of the variable itself
14
. 
The results confirm us that capital intensity growth and R&D investments 
are endogenous with respect to the growth of labour productivity, while 
the share of employment in KIBS can be considered as exogenous. 
 
After these preliminary tests we estimate equation (14) through the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) exploiting the moment 
conditions previously introduced. The set of instruments contains the two 
                                                 
13
 In order not to lose too many observations we decided to use only one and two years lags ( 2itx and 3itx ,) of the 
independent variables. 
14
 In order to implement the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test we used the Stata command ivendog, written by  Baum, Schaffer 
and Stillman. 
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and three-years lags of capital intensity growth, R&D intensity, the KIBS 
share of employment and the openness to trade. In Table (7) we report the 
results of the GMM estimates. 
 
In columns (1) and (2) of Table (7) are presented the result of the 
estimation of equation (14) when the contemporaneous levels of the 
independent variables are introduced. The F-test related with the first –
stage estimation confirms us that our instruments are not weak, 
furthermore the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions always accepts 
the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the instruments. These findings 
support our preliminary instruments choice. When we look at the 
coefficients of the regressors we find that the major findings observed in 
the OLS specification are left unaffected: R&D intensity and KIBS share 
of employment are not significant as far as their interaction variable is not 
included, while they become negative and significant when the interaction 
term is introduced, the interaction term is always positive and significant. 
The openness to trade variable is instead always positive and significant, 
but it does not influence the size and sign of the other variables.  
 
In columns (3) and (4) instead the regressors are one-year lagged: also in 
this case the F-test and the Sargan test confirm our choice of instruments. 
What is more important the coefficients of our variables of interest are left 
unaffected, thus confirming the robustness of our previous estimates. 
 
These results contrast and complement at the same time the stream of 
literature focused on the role of R&D activities in productivity and growth 
at large. The evidence provided by Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) and 
Guellec and Pottelsberg de la Pottery (2001) suggests the existence of a 
positive relationship between R&D and productivity growth. However it 
must be stressed that these authors, through the use of panel cointegration 
analyses, have explored the long-run relationship between R&D activities 
and GDP, that is their steady state relationship. In this study instead, by 
using   the growth rates of labour productivity and capital intensity (rather 
than their levels), we have investigated the short run dynamics occurring 
between R&D and productivity growth. In other words the positive 
relationship does not necessarily apply during the process of structural 
change shaped by the decline of manufacturing industry and the 
complementary increase of the share of employment in KIBS. In such a 
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transition phase indeed the direction of technological change favors the 
reduction of the manufacturing industry and hence of capital intensity with 
the consequent reduction of the rates of growth of output and labor 
productivity. The traditional expectation of a positive relationship between 
the intensity of technological change, as proxied by the intensity of R&D 
activities, and economic performances applies instead before and after the 
transition to a knowledge economy. 
 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The paper provides an analytical framework supported by qualitative and 
empirical evidence on the effects of the twin globalization of product and 
financial markets on the rate and direction of technological innovation and 
structural change and ultimately on the performances of the economic 
system of the advanced economies in the last two decades. The 
interpretative framework integrates in a single approach the analysis of the 
intertwining dynamics of the changing international division of labor, the 
new pace and direction of technological change and the rapid structural 
change in advanced countries.  
 
The framework rests upon the grafting of four distinct and yet 
complementary theoretical traditions: a) the Schumperian approach about 
innovation as a form of creative reaction spurred by unexpected changes in 
product and factor markets, b) the Kuznets analysis of the relations 
between technological and structural changes as intertwined and 
inseparable aspects of economic change, c) the induced technological 
change approach and d) the Heckesher-Ohlin analysis of international 
economics.  
 
The integration of these separated literatures enables to articulate a far-
reaching interpretative framework that draws on the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis about the determinants of the rate of technological change, 
according to which innovation is the creative response of firms caught in 
out-of-equilibrium conditions. The Schumpeterian hypothesis allows to 
explain how and why firms in advanced countries reacted to the 
globalization of product markets with the introduction of a new 
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technological system based upon the new gale of in information and 
communication technologies. Furthermore, following the Kuznets intuition 
about the strict complementarity between radical technological change and 
structural change, the paper suggests that new technological system 
enabled the emergence of a new knowledge-intensive business service 
industry, where knowledge could be generated and exploited as a service 
activity. It combines these arguments with the new emphasis of the 
induced technological change approach upon the role of technological 
congruence, defined in terms of the matching between the bias in the 
direction of technological change and the local endowment of production 
factor.  
 
This perspective allows to account for the consequences of the twin 
globalization of product and capital markets, the consequent identification 
of skills as the most abundant input in advanced countries and the induced 
skill intensive bias of technological change in advanced economies into a 
dynamic version of the Heckesher-Ohlin that is able to explain the 
endogenous changes in their international specialization.    
 
According to this framework globalization brought about by the entry of 
new labor abundant countries in international markets had profound effects 
on advanced countries. It changed the specialization of incumbents and 
their role in the international division of labor and caused the introduction 
of a new gale of technological innovations characterized by a strong skill 
bias. Technological change favored a major structural change with the 
decline of the role of the manufacturing industry and the emergence of a 
strong knowledge intensive business service sector. The new biased 
direction of technological change accelerated the substitution of both 
capital and unskilled labor with skilled workers.  The globalization of both 
product and capital markets engendered the fall in the prices of 
manufactured goods ad the net outflows of capital from advanced 
countries. This in turn stirred the introduction of skill intensive 
information and communication technologies that paralleled the marked 
decline of the manufacturing industry and its substitution with skill 
intensive knowledge business services, with the ultimate effect of reducing 
the growth rates of working capital and hence the rates of growth of 
advanced economies.  
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The slow growth experienced by advanced economies in the last two 
decades is the physiological consequence of the systemic transformation of 
their economic structure into light economies. 
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Figure 1. Hours worked in developed countries (manufacturing and KIBS) 
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Figure 2. KIBS share of employment and R&D intensity 
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Figure 4. Capital intensity in advanced countries (manufacturing and 
KIBS) 
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       Table 1: the evolution of capital intensity within KIBS and manufacturing sectors 
  subperiod: 1990-2000   subperiod: 2000-2007 
Countries    capital intensity ratio 
 
capital intensity ratio 
KIBS Manufacturing  (1)/(2)   KIBS Manufacturing  (1)/(2) 
        Australia 21.27 30.14 0.71 
 
27.97 42.78 0.65 
Denmark 23.00 38.41 0.60 
 
39.51 55.03 0.71 
France 25.74 45.33 0.57 
 
33.02 54.59 0.60 
Germany 40.81 43.75 0.94 
 
63.94 62.62 1.02 
Italy 58.11 54.29 1.09 
 
38.59 70.17 0.55 
Japan 52.04 61.70 0.85 
 
64.73 91.58 0.71 
Netherlands 18.28 56.12 0.33 
 
26.49 67.40 0.39 
Spain 10.96 46.24 0.23 
 
17.22 55.12 0.31 
Sweden 14.02 29.01 0.48 
 
33.49 57.59 0.58 
United Kingdom 10.04 27.83 0.36 
 
19.50 38.48 0.51 
United States 11.99 37.40 0.32 
 
30.40 53.07 0.57 
        All countries 26.02 42.75 0.59   35.57 58.57 0.60 
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Table 2. Capital intensity and KIBS employment 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
 
n=1 n=1 n=1 
 
n=1 n=1 n=1 
 
n=4 n=4 
 
j=0 j=0 j=0 
 
j=1 j=1 j=1 
 
j=0 j=1 
Δn ln KIBSit-j -0.303*** -0.293*** -0.215*** 
 
-0.150*** -0.134** -0.148** 
 
-0.238*** -0.225* 
 
(0.051) (0.051) (0.033) 
 
(0.049) (0.053) (0.055) 
 
(0.078) (0.105) 
Δn ln RDit-j 
 
-0.051** -0.044*** 
  
-0.076*** -0.068*** 
 
-0.121*** -0.162*** 
  
(0.017) (0.014) 
  
(0.024) (0.020) 
 
(0.036) (0.047) 
Δn ln wit-j 
  
-0.106* 
   
0.062 
 
-0.019 0.031 
   
(0.050) 
   
(0.049) 
 
(0.127) (0.093) 
OPENit-j 
  
-0.001*** 
   
-0.001*** 
 
-0.002* -0.002* 
   
(0.000) 
   
(0.000) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
time 
dummies yes yes yes 
 
yes yes yes 
 
yes yes 
           Constant 0.056*** 0.059*** 0.108*** 
 
0.055*** 0.061*** 0.116*** 
 
0.244*** 0.227*** 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.009) 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.020) 
 
(0.053) (0.072) 
Observations 245 227 226 
 
241 222 222 
 
48 47 
R-squared 0.633 0.687 0.769 
 
0.466 0.549 0.651 
 
0.691 0.679 
Number of id 15 15 15 
 
15 15 15 
 
15 15 
The dependent variable in all models is the growth rate of capital intensity K. The period of observation is 1990-2007: time dummies are 
included in all models. All models are estimated through  Fixed Effects estimators, controlling for heteroskedasticity. In all specifications 
the Hausman test rejected the consistency of (GLS) Random Effects estimators. In columns (1), (2) and (3) the yearly growth rate of 
capital intensity is regressed on the contemporaneous yearly growth rates of the independent variables. In column (4), (5) and (6) the 
yearly growth rates of the independent variables are 1-year lagged. In column (7) the 4-years growth rate of capital intensity is regressed 
against  the contemporaneous 4-years growth rates of the independent variables. In column (8)  the 4-years growth rates of the 
independent variables are 1-year lagged. In columns (7) and (8) only the years 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007 are included. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3. Growth rate (%) of non-ICT Capital Services: advanced countries 
time Denmark Finland France Germany Italy Netherlands Sweden United 
Kingdom 
Canada United 
States 
Australia Japan 
1990 2,93 4,62 3,41 2,77 3,39 2,58 4,64 3,35 3,89 1,91 4,36 5,76 
1991 2,32 2,03 3,22 3,36 3,22 2,54 2,70 2,57 2,84 1,50 3,15 5,70 
1992 1,74 0,06 2,78 3,22 2,70 2,19 0,59 2,09 2,02 1,16 2,61 4,96 
1993 0,81 -0,89 2,15 2,04 1,48 1,70 -0,18 1,90 1,38 1,34 2,66 3,90 
1994 0,69 -2,33 1,85 1,24 0,72 1,36 -0,16 1,68 1,41 1,78 2,96 2,59 
1995 1,39 -2,50 1,87 1,17 1,23 1,62 1,06 1,48 1,79 2,14 3,32 1,93 
1996 1,76 -0,96 1,77 1,07 1,64 2,09 1,99 1,66 1,80 2,34 3,39 2,04 
1997 1,88 0,40 1,71 1,04 1,66 2,32 2,18 2,24 2,58 2,50 3,65 1,95 
1998 2,43 1,28 1,93 1,20 1,91 2,48 2,24 3,10 3,40 2,78 3,97 1,51 
1999 2,33 1,47 2,37 1,36 2,28 2,79 2,62 3,42 3,61 2,99 3,89 1,07 
2000 2,19 1,45 2,84 1,57 2,51 2,79 2,78 2,75 3,72 3,03 3,61 0,98 
2001 2,34 2,04 3,04 1,39 2,64 2,33 2,73 2,34 3,36 2,68 3,35 0,89 
2002 1,86 1,91 2,83 0,71 2,78 1,70 2,38 2,35 2,81 1,97 3,48 0,56 
2003 1,32 1,11 2,52 0,38 2,53 1,24 2,17 2,20 2,55 1,49 4,68 0,32 
2004 1,03 0,66 2,40 0,46 2,16 0,91 2,31 2,03 2,64 1,49 5,71 0,40 
2005 0,76 0,56 2,52 0,54 2,01 0,70 2,45 1,99 3,01 1,81 5,72 0,69 
2006 1,28 0,53 2,66 0,79 1,96 1,03 2,72 2,13 3,55 2,18 5,63 0,86 
2007 2,08 1,12 2,84 1,28 2,06 1,58 3,20 2,69 3,43 2,24 5,62 0,78 
90-07 1,73 0,70 2,48 1,42 2,16 1,88 2,13 2,33 2,77 2,07 3,99 2,05 
Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database™ 
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Table 4. Growth rate (%) of non-ICT Capital Services: industrializing countries 
time China India Indonesia Malaysia South 
Korea 
Taiwan Thailand Singapore Brazil 
1990 5,47 5,24 6,34 6,18 12,00 10,44 11,98 9,28 2,02 
1991 5,84 4,75 7,39 9,60 12,65 9,78 13,20 8,39 1,54 
1992 7,41 4,44 7,88 10,64 11,45 10,27 12,12 6,57 1,30 
1993 9,69 4,46 7,29 11,22 9,76 10,19 11,10 7,44 1,43 
1994 10,83 4,87 7,21 12,90 10,09 9,53 10,81 6,95 1,65 
1995 10,56 6,30 7,87 13,92 11,19 9,40 11,22 6,01 2,14 
1996 10,48 6,11 8,70 13,21 10,94 8,92 11,24 6,50 2,57 
1997 9,93 5,48 9,20 12,36 8,36 8,72 8,18 7,18 2,73 
1998 9,22 5,36 6,86 6,67 4,18 8,65 2,23 4,74 2,79 
1999 8,42 5,46 3,45 0,61 2,68 7,76 -1,26 2,91 2,15 
2000 7,81 5,56 3,00 1,95 4,12 7,49 -0,14 5,21 1,82 
2001 7,98 5,20 3,80 3,13 4,75 5,49 0,97 4,37 2,04 
2002 8,56 5,17 4,00 2,88 4,80 3,03 1,10 1,65 1,84 
2003 9,67 5,25 3,81 2,52 5,20 2,63 1,72 -0,92 1,32 
2004 10,37 5,84 4,16 1,96 4,92 3,79 2,71 -1,20 1,30 
2005 10,51 6,68 5,03 2,32 4,90 4,85 3,54 0,73 1,64 
2006 10,74 7,41 5,14 2,83 4,93 4,32 3,83 1,55 2,06 
2007 10,72 8,32 5,16 3,32 5,04 4,03 3,60 3,07 3,18 
90-07 9,12 5,66 5,91 6,57 7,33 7,18 6,01 4,47 1,97 
Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database™ 
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Figure 5: Average Growth rate (%) in non-ICT Capital Services 
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Table 5. The determinants of labour productivity growth 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES j=0 j=0 j=0 
 
j=1 j=1 j=1 
                
ln(kit-j/kit-j-1) 0.328*** 0.297*** 0.455*** 
 
0.399*** 0.379*** 0.461*** 
 
(0.074) (0.064) (0.081) 
 
(0.068) (0.059) (0.065) 
ln RD intit-j 0.006 -0.010 -0.016** 
 
0.006 -0.006 -0.012** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
KIBSit-j 0.043 -1.187** -1.198** 
 
0.101 -0.853* -0.915* 
 
(0.185) (0.516) (0.423) 
 
(0.172) (0.471) (0.472) 
ln RD intit-j*KIBSit-j 
 
0.164*** 0.135** 
  
0.127** 0.119** 
  
(0.054) (0.051) 
  
(0.053) (0.051) 
OPENit-j 
  
0.105*** 
   
0.073** 
   
(0.033) 
   
(0.027) 
constant -0.046 0.081 0.073 
 
-0.039 0.055 0.064 
 
(0.043) (0.059) (0.055) 
 
(0.045) (0.050) (0.047) 
        Observations 233 233 233 
 
229 229 229 
R-squared 0.273 0.294 0.405 
 
0.345 0.358 0.411 
Number of id 15 15 15 
 
15 15 15 
The dependent variable in all models is the yearly growth rate of labour productivity. The period of observation is 1990-
2007: country and time dummies are included in all models. All models  are estimated through OLS estimators, 
controlling for heteroskedasticity. In columns (1), (2) and (3) the yearly growth rate of labour productivity is regressed 
on the contemporaneous levels and growth rates of the independent variables. In column (4), (5) and (6) the independent 
variables are 1-year lagged. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. Endogeneity specification tests. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES IV  IV IV 
 
ln(kit/kit-1) ln RD intit KIBSit 
        
ln(kit/kit-1) 0.71*** 0.41*** 0.47*** 
 
(0.11) (0.067) (0.073) 
ln RD intit 0.00016 -0.046*** -0.0096 
 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.016) 
KIBSit -0.54 -2.52*** -0.94 
 
(0.52) (0.56) (1.08) 
ln RD intit*KIBSit 0.044 0.30*** 0.10 
 
(0.067) (0.072) (0.14) 
OPENit 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 
 
(0.019) (0.017) (0.016) 
Constant 0.012 0.38*** 0.086 
 
(0.087) (0.095) (0.14) 
    Observations 227 220 228 
R-squared 0.506 0.511 0.529 
Sargan Test of overidentifying restrictions Chi-sq 17.318 0.308 1.357 
p-value 0.000 0.579 0.244 
Durin-Wu-Hausman test Chi-sq 9.076 20.221 0.027 
p-value 0.00259 0.000 0.870 
Time dummies Y Y Y 
Country dummies Y Y Y 
All models are estimated through IV estimators. The dependent variable is the yearly growth of 
labour productivity. In column (1) only the growth of capital intensity ln(kit/kit-1) is instrumented 
with its own lags (one and two-years lags). In column (2) the R&D intensity (ln RD intit) is 
instrumented with its own lags: in order to achieve a better predictive power of the instruments, 
only two and three-years lags have been used. In column (3) only the share of employment in 
KIBS sector (KIBSit)  is instrumented with its firts two lags. The Sargan test of overidentifying 
restrictions checks for the goodness of the instruments, while the Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests 
performs a specification test in which the coefficient of the instrumented variable is confronted 
with the coefficient obtained through a normal OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
 53 
Table 7. The determinants of labour productivity growth, 
instrumental variables 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
VARIABLES j=0 j=0 
 
j=1 j=1 
                  
ln(kit-j/kit-j-1) 0.842*** 0.778*** 
 
0.618*** 0.429*** 
 
(0.146) (0.156) 
 
(0.095) (0.084) 
ln RD intit-j -0.009 -0.037** 
 
-0.006 -0.024** 
 
(0.010) (0.015) 
 
(0.007) (0.010) 
KIBSit-j -0.181 -2.133*** 
 
-0.014 -1.375** 
 
(0.152) (0.736) 
 
-0.123 (0.570) 
OPENit-j 0.155*** 0.156*** 
 
0.097*** 0.090*** 
 
(0.028) (0.027) 
 
(0.021) (0.021) 
ln RD intit-j*KIBSit-j 
 
0.264*** 
  
0.180** 
  
(0.096) 
  
(0.075) 
      Constant 0.063 0.267** 
 
0.027 0.166** 
 
(0.096) (0.131) 
 
(0.067) (0.082) 
      Observations 212 212 
 
212 212 
R-squared 0.444 0.440 
 
0.537 0.533 
First stage F-test ln(kit-j/kit-j-1) 65.911 16.646 
 
16.483 6.462 
p-value 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
First stage F-test ln RD intit-j 45.096 134.022 
 
121.648 46.667 
p-value 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
Sargan test of overid 9.157 0.905 
 
0.981 10.259 
p-value 0.242 0.989   0.986 0.114 
All models are estimated through IV-GMM estimators with heteroskedasticity-robust weight 
matrix. The dependent variable is the yearly growth of labour productivity. The period of 
observation is 1990-2007. The set of instruments, common to all equations, is: ln(kit-2/kit-3), 
ln(kit-3/kit-4), ln RD intit-2, ln RD intit-3, OPENit-2, OPENit-3, KIBSit-2, KIBSit-3. Time and country 
dummies are included. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 6. The marginal effect of R&D conditional on KIBS 
 
 
Figure 7. The marginal effect of KIBS conditional on R&D 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
TABLE A1. 
List of countries included in the OECD 
STAN/BERD DATABASE (1990-2010) 
   Australia 
 
Italy 
Austria 
 
Japan 
Belgium 
 
Luxembourg* 
Canada 
 
Netherlands 
Czech Republic* 
 
Norway 
Estonia* 
 
Portugal  
Finland 
 
Slovak republic* 
France 
 
Slovenia* 
Germany 
 
Spain 
Greece* 
 
Switzerland* 
Hungary* 
 
United Kingdom 
Israel* 
 
United States 
      
countries maked with an asterisk could not be used in 
the estimation of equations (5) and (13) because of the 
lack of data on either capital stocks or openness to 
trade 
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Table 2A: Descriptive statistics of the panel dataset 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation # Obs. # countries T 
   
overall between within 
   
itKIBS  1990-2007 0.140 0.048 0.044 0.024 254 15 16.9 
         
itKIBS1  1990-2007 0.042 0.032 0.008 0.031 250 15 16.7 
         
itRD int  1990-2007 6.781 0.804 0.787 0.230 246 15 16.4 
         
itRD1  1990-2007 0.042 0.069 0.032 0.061 244 15 16.3 
         
itKln  1990-2007 12.166 0.283 0.308 0.090 258 15 17.2 
         
itKln1  1990-2007 0.018 0.018 0.010 0.016 255 15 17 
         
itn w  1990-2007 0.044 0.032 0.016 0.027 265 15 17.7 
         
itOPEN  1990-2007 64.34 32.26 32.10 8.69 270 15 18 
         
itit RDKIBS int*  1990-2007 0.993 0.375 0.355 0.184 239 15 15.9 
Note:T indicates the average number of observations per country
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